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Abstract
We study the problem of eliciting and aggregating probabilis-
tic information from multiple agents. In order to successfully
aggregate the predictions of agents, the principal needs to
elicit some notion of confidence from agents, capturing how
much experience or knowledge led to their predictions. To
formalize this, we consider a principal who wishes to learn
the distribution of a random variable. A group of Bayesian
agents has each privately observed some independent samples
of the random variable. The principal wishes to elicit enough
information from each agent, so that her posterior is the same
as if she had directly received all of the samples herself.
Leveraging techniques from Bayesian statistics, we represent
confidence as the number of samples an agent has observed,
which is quantified by a hyperparameter from a conjugate
family of prior distributions. This then allows us to show that
if the principal has access to a few samples, she can achieve
her aggregation goal by eliciting predictions from agents us-
ing proper scoring rules. In particular, with access to one sam-
ple, she can successfully aggregate the agents’ predictions if
and only if every posterior predictive distribution corresponds
to a unique value of the hyperparameter, a property which
holds for many common distributions of interest. When this
uniqueness property does not hold, we construct a novel and
intuitive mechanism where a principal with two samples can
elicit and optimally aggregate the agents’ predictions.
1 Introduction
Imagine that a principal, Alice, wishes to estimate the prob-
ability of rain tomorrow. She consults two agents, Bob who
says 80%, and Carol who says 10%. How should Alice ag-
gregate these two widely disparate predictions? If she knew
that Bob happened to have spent the day studying radar im-
agery, whereas Carol just looked outside for a second, it
would seem obvious that Alice should give much higher
weight to Bob’s prediction than Carol’s. In other words, in
order to aggregate these predictions, Alice needs to know the
agents’ confidence about their reports.
The aggregation of probabilistic information is an impor-
tant problem in many domains, from multiagent systems to
crowdsourcing. In this paper, we propose a general method
of eliciting predictions together with a measure of confi-
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dence about those predictions, and show how to use this in-
formation to optimally aggregate in many situations.
We consider a Bayesian model where a principal, who
can consult a group of risk-neutral agents, wishes to ob-
tain an informed prediction about a random variable. The
random variable follows a parameterized distribution that is
generated by some unknown parameters, the prior distribu-
tion over which is common knowledge. Each agent privately
observes some independent samples of the random variable
and forms a belief about it. The principal then elicits the
agents’ predictions of the random variable, and her goal is
to optimally aggregate agents’ private beliefs based on these
predictions—to compute the distribution of the random vari-
able as if she had observed the samples of all agents.
This paper focuses on designing elicitation mechanisms
to achieve this optimal aggregation. We show that when the
prior distribution of the unknown parameters comes from a
conjugate prior family of the distribution of the random vari-
able, the principal can leverage a few independent samples
that she observes to successfully elicit enough information
from the agents to achieve the optimal aggregation. This re-
lies on important properties of the conjugate prior family.
Intuitively, we use the hyperparameter of a distribution in
the conjugate family to quantify the confidence of an agent’s
belief as the hyperparameter encodes information about the
samples that the agent has observed. Our mechanisms work
by eliciting predictions that allow the principal to infer the
confidence of the agents and then make use of the confidence
to achieve the optimal aggregation.
In particular, we prove that the principal can leverage a
single sample to achieve optimal aggregation if and only
if each distribution (modulo an equivalence relation) in the
conjugate family maps to a unique hyperparameter. With
this, we demonstrate how elicitation and optimal aggrega-
tion work for many common distributions of the random
variable, including the Poisson, Normal, and uniform dis-
tributions, among others.
When the unique mapping condition is not satisfied, such
as in the rain example above, we show that the hyperparam-
eter of an agent’s posterior distribution cannot be inferred
with the principal’s single sample. Fortunately, in this set-
ting we construct a mechanism where the principal can still
achieve the optimal aggregation if she has access to two in-
dependent samples of the random variable. Our mechanism
simply asks each agent for his believed distribution of the
first sample, and the likelihood that the two samples are the
same. We show that this simple and intuitive approach gives
the principal second-order information about agents’ beliefs,
which is enough to achieve optimal aggregation.
1.1 Related Work
Our problem simultaneously considers both one-shot elicita-
tion of information from multiple agents and the subsequent
aggregation of the information.
In one-shot elicitation, the principal interacts with each
agent independently and the agents report their predictions
without knowing others’ predictions. There is a rich litera-
ture on mechanisms for one-shot elicitation. The simplest is
the classical proper scoring rules (Brier 1950; Winkler 1969;
Savage 1971; Gneiting and Raftery 2007), which incen-
tivize risk-neutral agents to honestly report their predictions.
Proper scoring rules are the building blocks for most elic-
itation mechanisms, including our mechanisms in this pa-
per. To reduce the total cost to the principal in the form
of payments to the agents, researchers design shared scor-
ing rules (Kilgour and Gerchak 2004; Johnstone 2007) and
wagering mechanisms (Lambert et al. 2008; 2014; Chen et
al. 2014) that have various desirable theoretical properties.
Both shared scoring rules and wagering mechanisms engage
agents in a one-shot betting to elicit their information and do
not require the principal to subsidize the betting. In contrast
to our problem, all these one-shot elicitation mechanisms do
not consider the aggregation of the elicited information.
Sequential mechanisms have also been designed to both
elicit and aggregate information from agents. The most well
known are probably prediction markets (Berg et al. 2001;
Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2004), especially the market scoring
rule mechanism (Hanson 2003; 2007), where agents sequen-
tially interact with the market mechanism multiple times to
reveal their information. Information aggregation can hap-
pen when agents update their beliefs after observing other
agents’ activities in the market, although the dynamic na-
ture of these mechanisms can induce complicated strate-
gic play and obfuscate individual-level information (Hansen,
Schmidt, and Strobel 2001; Chen et al. 2010; Gao, Zhang,
and Chen 2013). Aggregation can also occur if agents are
myopic with fixed beliefs (Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2006;
Storkey, Millin, and Geras 2012; Frongillo, Della Penna, and
Reid 2012; Sethi and Vaughan 2013). Like us, Abernethy et
al. (2014) make use of exponential families. In this paper,
the principal rather than the agents takes the responsibility
of aggregating information, coupling aggregation with one-
shot elicitation that is incentive compatible for the agents.
More closely related to our work, Bayesian truth serum
and peer prediction methods seek to aggregate the signals
agents receive. They operate in a setting where the princi-
pal has no direct access to the random variable, however, so
the reports of agents must be used to evaluate each other. Pr-
elec (2004) introduced the Bayesian truth serum approach,
which uses two reports: the agent’s signal, and a posterior
over others’ reports. Witkowski and Parkes (2012) relax the
need for the principal to have access to a large pool of agents
and know the common prior. Miller, Resnick, and Zeck-
hauser (2005) introduced peer prediction, in which agents
report their signal and are scored based on a randomly se-
lected peer reference signal. While many of these mecha-
nisms work in categorical settings and require two reports,
they appear to do so for different reasons from ours. In par-
ticular, in all these settings the number of samples is fixed to
one while our entire purpose of the second report is to learn
the number of samples.
To achieve optimal aggregation, the principal in our paper
needs to know the confidence of agents’ predictions. The
work of Fang et al. (2007) is closest to ours in this perspec-
tive. They consider the one-shot elicitation of both agents’
predictions and the precision of their predictions and then
use the elicited precision to optimally aggregate. They use
Normal distributions to model both the distribution of the
random variable and the prior distribution of the unknown
parameters. We consider general parameterized distributions
of the random variable and their corresponding conjugate
priors, which include the model of Fang et al. (2007) as a
special case. They deal with some issues we do not, how-
ever, by assuming that agents may have different costs to
acquire their signals, and that the principal only wishes to
acquire the cost-effective ones.
2 Model and Background
We introduce our model, which describes how agents form
their beliefs, the principal’s elicitation mechanism, the prin-
cipal’s aggregation goal, and a family of parameterized prior
distributions that we will focus on in this paper.
2.1 Beliefs of Agents
The principal would like to get information from m agents
about a random variable with observable outcome space X .
The distribution of the random variable comes from a param-
eterized family of distributions {p(x|θ)}θ∈Θ ⊆ ∆X , where
Θ is the parameter space.1 There exists a prior distribution
p(θ) over the parameters. Both {p(x|θ)}θ∈Θ and p(θ) are
common knowledge to the agents and the principal.
Nature draws the true parameter θ∗, which is unknown to
both the agents and the principal, according to the prior p(θ).
Each agent then receives some number of samples from X
which are drawn independently according to p(x|θ∗). In
other words, if x1, . . . , xN is an enumeration of all sam-
ples received by any of the agents, then p(xi, xj |θ∗) =
p(xi|θ∗)p(xj |θ∗) for all i, j and all θ∗ ∈ Θ.
Agents form their beliefs about the random variable
according to Bayes’ rule. If an agent receives samples
x1, . . . , xN , then we write the agent’s belief as
p = p(x|x1, . . . , xN ) =
∫
Θ
p(x|θ)p(θ|x1, . . . , xN )dθ
∝ ∫
Θ
p(θ)p(x|θ)∏j p(xj |θ)dθ . (1)
This distribution is known as the posterior predictive distri-
bution (PPD) of x given samples x1, . . . , xN , and will be a
central object of our analysis.
1By convention p(x|...) often refers to the entire distribution,
rather than the density value at a particular x; the usage should be
clear from context.
2.2 Elicitation and Scoring Rules
An important feature of our model is that the principal has
access to a sample x ∈ X herself, and can leverage this
sample using scoring rule techniques to elicit information
from the agents. The principal’s sample is also indepen-
dently drawn according to p(x|θ∗). (In Section 4, we will
allow the principal to have two such samples.)
The principal will choose a report space R, such as R =
[0, 1] for the rain forecast example, and a scoring mechanism
S : R × X → R. The principal requests a report ri ∈ R
from each agent i, and later upon receiving her sample x,
she then gives each agent a score of S(ri, x). We assume
that agents seek to maximize their expected score, so that if
agent i believes x ∼ p for some distribution p ∈ ∆X , then
he will report ri ∈ argmaxr∈R Ex∼p[S(r, x)].
Proper scoring rules (Brier 1950; Gneiting and Raftery
2007) are the basic tools for designing such scores S that
provide good incentive properties. A scoring rule is strictly
proper if reporting one’s true belief uniquely maximizes the
expected score. For example, the logarithmic scoring rule
S(p, x) = log p(x) (2)
is a popular strictly proper scoring rule for eliciting a dis-
tribution over X , where p(x) is the reported probability for
outcome x. Scoring rules can also be derived for expecta-
tions of random variables; for example the Brier score (Brier
1950), given in generic form by S(r, x) = 2rx− r2, can be
used to elicit the first k moments (E[x], . . .E[xk]), as
S(r1, . . . , rk, x) =
k∑
j=1
2rjx
j − r2j . (3)
While there are general scoring rule characterizations for
distributions (Gneiting and Raftery 2007) and expecta-
tions (Savage 1971; Frongillo and Kash 2014), in this paper
we do not need such details; apart from examples for con-
creteness, our results only use the fact that such scores exist.
2.3 Aggregation
The goal of the principal is to aggregate the information of
the agents to obtain an accurate distribution of the random
variable as if she had access to all of the samples from all
agents. Throughout the paper, we will denote byX this mul-
tiset of all observed samples by agents.2
Definition 1. Given prior p(θ) and data X distributed
among the agents, the global posterior predictive distribu-
tion (global PPD) is the posterior predictive distribution
p(x|X).
The goal of this paper is to design mechanisms which
truthfully elicit information from agents in such a way that
the global PPD p(x|X) can be computed. We capture this
desideratum in the following definition.
Definition 2. Let S : R × X → R be given, and let
each agent i receive samples Xi, with X = unionmultiiXi (multi-
set addition). Let ri be the report of agent i, namely ri =
2We use multisets, or equivalently unordered lists, as when X
is a finite set it is likely that samples will not be unique.
argmaxr Ep(x|Xi)[S(r, x)]. Then S achieves optimal aggre-
gation if there exists some function g : Rm → ∆X such that
g(r1, · · · , rm) = p(x|X).
It is worth noting that the report space R of the elicita-
tion mechanism is often different from the space of PPD, i.e.
∆X . In fact, we will design elicitation mechanisms such that
the elicited reports help the principal to infer the confidence
of agents, capturing the number of samples that the agents
have experienced, which then enables the optimal aggrega-
tion. This leads to our focus on the conjugate prior family.
As a motivating example, consider the Normal distribu-
tion case, with p(x|θ) = N(θ, 1) and p(θ) = N(µ, 1), where
N(µ, σ2) is the normal distribution with mean µ and vari-
ance σ2. It is well known that an agent i has posterior distri-
bution p(θ|Xi) = N((µ+x1+· · ·+xNi)/(Ni+1), 1/(Ni+
1)
)
after observing samples Xi = {x1, . . . , xNi}. His es-
timate of the mean µi is the weighted sum of his sample
and the prior mean. The inverse of the variance, Ni + 1, is
called the precision, which encodes the agent’s confidence
or experience. Hence, if the principal can elicit mean esti-
mate µi and precisionNi+1 from each of them agents, she
can calculate the global PPD, which is a Normal distribution
with mean 1N+1 (µ+
∑
iNiµi) and variance
1
N+1 , where
N =
∑
iNi. This is the case studied by Fang, Stinchcombe,
and Whinston (2007). We will see next that the general no-
tion of conjugate priors will allow us to preserve the impor-
tant aggregation properties we require elegantly.
2.4 Conjugate Priors
In this paper, we focus on prior distributions p(θ) that
come from the conjugate prior family for distributions
{p(x|θ)}θ∈Θ. This ensures that the posterior distribution on
θ is in the same family of distributions as the prior p(θ) and
also simplifies the optimal aggregation problem.
While many notions of conjugate priors appear in the lit-
erature (Fink 1997; Gelman et al. 2013), we adopt the fol-
lowing definition, which says that the conjugate prior family
is parameterized by hyperparameters ν and n which are lin-
early updated after observing samples: the new parameters
can be written as a linear combination of the old parameters
and sufficient statistics for the samples.
Definition 3. Let P = {p(x|θ) : θ ∈ Θ} ⊆ ∆X be given. A
family of distributions {p(θ|ν, n) : ν ∈ Rk, n ∈ R+} ⊆ ∆Θ
is a conjugate prior family for P if there exists a statistic φ :
X → Rk such that, given the prior distribution p(θ|ν0, n0),
the posterior distribution on θ after observing x,
p(θ|ν0, n0, x) = p(θ|ν0, n0)p(x|θ)∫
Θ
p(θ′|ν0, n0)p(x|θ′)dθ′ , (4)
is equal to p(θ|ν0 + φ(x), n0 + 1) for all ν0 and n0.
Using conjugate priors, the optimal aggregation problem
simplifies considerably. Given prior p(θ|ν0, n0) and data
X = {x1, . . . , xN} distributed among the agents, the global
PPD can be written succinctly as
p(x|ν0, n0, X) = p
(
x
∣∣∣ ν0 + N∑
i=1
φ(xi), n0 +N
)
. (5)
We can see that as we require n to update by 1 for each
additional sample, n − n0 exactly corresponds to the num-
ber of samples seen in total. This is precisely the notion of
confidence we wish to quantify — the amount of data or ex-
perience that led to a prediction. In particular, if we could
obtain the hyperparameters (νi, ni) for an agent’s report, we
could directly compute the number of samplesNi = ni−n0
they observed, as well as the sum of the sufficient statistics
of their samples,
∑
x∈Xi φ(x). If the principal can gather
these two quantities from each agent i, then using the identi-
ties
∑
x∈Xi φ(x) = νi−ν0 and Ni = ni−n0, the principal
can aggregate these parameters by the observation that
N∑
i=1
φ(xi) =
m∑
i=1
∑
x∈Xi
φ(x) =
m∑
i=1
(νi − ν0) (6)
N =
m∑
i=1
Ni =
m∑
i=1
(ni − n0) . (7)
From here, the principal simply plugs these values into
eq. (5) to obtain the global PPD.
3 Unique Predictive Distributions
In this section, we show how the principal can leverage a
single sample x ∈ X to elicit the hyperparameters of the
posterior distributions of the agents, provided that the map-
ping from hyperparameters to predictive posterior distribu-
tions is unique. Note that this statement contains two differ-
ent types of posterior distributions, and as the distinction is
important we take a moment to recall their differences. Af-
ter making his observations, an agent will have updated his
hyperparameters to (ν, n). This gives him a posterior distri-
bution p(θ|ν, n) over the parameter of the random variable
and a predictive posterior distribution (PPD) p(x|ν, n) of the
random variable itself.
We begin with two simple but important results. The first
is an analog of the revelation principle from economic the-
ory, showing that the most a principal with a single sample
x ∈ X can get from an agent is the agent’s private belief
p ∈ ∆X about x.
Lemma 1. Given a sample x ∈ X which an agent believes
to be drawn from p ∈ ∆X , any information obtained with a
mechanism S : R× X → R, from an agent maximizing his
expected score, can be written as a function of p.
Proof. We need only find a function f : ∆X → R such that
f(p) ∈ argmaxr∈R Ex∼p[S(r, x)] whenever the argmax
exists. Let r0 ∈ R be arbitrary. For all p ∈ ∆X , simply
select rp ∈ argmaxr∈R Ex∼p[S(r, x)], or rp = r0 if the
argmax is not defined, and let f(p) = rp.
While intuitive and almost obvious, Lemma 1 is quite use-
ful when thinking about elicitation problems. For example,
it is clear that the principal can take R = ∆X and use any
strictly proper scoring rule to get the agent’s PPD p(x|ν, n).
One might be tempted, however, to seek more information:
if one could simply elicit the posterior p(θ|ν, n), then the
hyperparameters (ν, n) would be readily available for ag-
gregation. One tantalizing scheme would be to compute the
distribution p(θ|x) and generate a sample θˆ ∼ p(θ|x), and
then use this θˆ to elicit p(θ|ν, n) using a strictly proper scor-
ing rule. Lemma 1 says that, while this may succeed, it will
only succeed when the principal could have simply com-
puted p(θ|ν, n) from the PPD p(x|ν, n) to begin with.
For precisely this reason, we will see that being able to
map the PPD to the posterior distribution is crucial to being
able to optimally aggregate. Before proving this, we need to
introduce some more precise notation to describe the rela-
tionship between the hyperparameters and the PPD.
Definition 4. Given hyperparameters (ν0, n0), we say
(ν, n) is reachable from (ν0, n0) if there exists a multiset X
of X such that ν = ν0 +
∑
x∈X φ(x) and n = n0 + |X|. Ad-
ditionally, we define the relation (ν, n) ≡ (ν′, n′) if for all
suchX , including ∅, we have p(x|ν, n,X) = p(x|ν′, n′, X).
Theorem 2. Given a family of distributions {p(x|θ)}
and conjugate prior p(θ|ν0, n0), there exists a mechanism
S achieving optimal aggregation if and only if for all
(ν, n) and (ν′, n′) reachable from (ν0, n0) we have that
p(x|ν, n) = p(x|ν′, n′) implies (ν, n) ≡ (ν′, n′).
Proof. We first prove the if direction. Let S be any strictly
proper scoring rule (e.g. the log score (2)); then the princi-
pal elicits pi = p(x|ν0, n0, Xi) = p(x|νi, ni) for all i. From
pi the principal cannot necessarily compute (νi, ni), but
she can choose some (ν′i, n
′
i) reachable from (ν0, n0) such
that pi = p(x|ν′i, n′i). We will show that since (νi, ni) ≡
(ν′i, n
′
i), this is enough to optimally aggregate. We will re-
strict to the case of two agents; the rest then follows by in-
duction. Let φ(X) =
∑
x∈X φ(x); by reachability, we have
X ′1, X
′
2 such that ν
′
i = ν0 + φ(X
′
i) and n
′
i = n0 + |X ′i|.
Thus,
p(x|ν0 +
∑
i(ν
′
i − ν0), n0 +
∑
i(n
′
i − n0))
= p(x|ν′2 + (ν′1 − ν0), n′2 + (n′1 − n0))
= p(x|ν′2 + φ(X ′1), n′2 + |X ′1|)
∗
= p(x|ν2 + φ(X ′1), n2 + |X ′1|)
= p(x|ν2 + (ν′1 − ν0), n2 + (n′1 − n0))
= p(x|ν′1 + (ν2 − ν0), n′1 + (n2 − n0))
= p(x|ν′1 + φ(X2), n′1 + |X2|)
∗
= p(x|ν1 + φ(X2), n1 + |X2|)
= p(x|ν1 + (ν2 − ν0), n1 + (n2 − n0))
= p(x|ν0 +
∑
i(νi − ν0), n0 +
∑
i(ni − n0)) ,
which is the global PPD. The starred equations used the fact
that (νi, ni) ≡ (ν′i, n′i).
For the only-if direction, assume that there are X,X ′
such that for ν = ν0 + φ(X) and ν′ = ν0 + φ(X ′), we
have p(x|ν, n) = p(x|ν′, n′) but (ν, n) 6≡ (ν′, n′). Then
we have some multiset X1 of X such that p(x|ν, n,X1) 6=
p(x|ν′, n′, X1). Now let agent 1 receive X1, and consider
two worlds, one in which X2 = X and the other in which
X2 = X
′. By Lemma 1, without loss of generality, the prin-
cipal uses S to elicit the PPD from both agents. However,
she cannot distinguish between these two worlds, as by as-
sumption agent 2’s PPD is the same in both. Unfortunately,
the global PPDs in these two situations are different:
p(x|ν0, n0, X1 unionmultiX) = p(x|ν, n,X1)
6= p(x|ν′, n′, X1)
= p(x|ν0, n0, X1 unionmultiX ′) .
Hence, the principal is unable to optimally aggregate.
An important corollary of Theorem 2, which we will
make extensive use of below, is that the principal can always
optimally aggregate if the PPD gives her full information
about the hyperparameters.
Corollary 3. If the map ϕ : (ν, n) 7→ p(x|ν, n) is injective,
the principal can optimally aggregate.
Proof. By injectivity, p(x|ν, n) = p(x|ν′, n′) implies
(ν, n) = (ν′, n′), and ≡ is an equivalence relation. More-
over, any strictly proper scoring rule S suffices as the mech-
anism, as this will elicit the PPD p, and then the principal
can compute (ν, n) = ϕ−1(p).
Remark 1. Theorem 2 and Corollary 3 yield a “recipe” for
elicitation that works for all the examples in this paper:
1. Elicit some number of moments of the PPD using any strictly
proper scoring rule. (In our examples the first two suffice.)
2. Calculate the posterior hyperparameters from these moments.
3. Use the prior hyperparameters to infer (the statistic of) each
agent’s samples and aggregate them.
In the following, we provide several examples illustrat-
ing the utility of Theorem 2, Corollary 3, and particularly
Remark 1. Before continuing, however, we would like to
discuss some practical consideratons. Strictly speaking, the
mechanism given by Corollary 3, which elicits the PPD and
inverts the map ϕ, suffices when the modeling assumptions
are all correct. If the model is slightly incorrect, however,
be it in our conditional independence assumption, the core
family p(x|θ), or even the particular choice of prior, this ap-
proach appears to provide no guarantees. Fortunately, when
we use the approach from Remark 1, we get useful infor-
mation about the PPD regardless of its form. For example,
we show below how to elicit the PPD for the Poisson dis-
tribution with a Gamma prior using a scoring rule for the
first and second moment (or equivalently, the mean and vari-
ance). This scoring rule has the property that it will elicit the
correct moments of any distribution, and thus if the agents’
PPD does not have the assumed form, a practitioner would
still have meaningful information about the agent’s belief for
a variety of approximate aggregation techniques.
Poisson Imagine that a citizen science project such as
eBird (Sullivan et al. 2009) wishes to collect observations
about sightings of various birds to deduce bird migration
patterns. Such a project may wish users to report the number
of birds of a particular species seen per minute. Of course, to
combine such estimates, eBird would like to know not only
the observed rate, but how long the user spend bird watch-
ing, so that it may weigh more highly reports from longer
time intervals; this is precisely what our approach offers.
For situations such as this one which involve counting
events in a specified time interval, the Poisson distribution is
a common choice. The parameter of the Poisson distribution
is λ ∈ R, the rate parameter, and the probability of observ-
ing x ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .} events in a unit time interval is given
by p(x|λ) = λxe−λ/x!. The canonical conjugate prior for
the Poisson distribution is the Gamma distribution, given by
p(λ|ν, n) = nνΓ(ν)λν−1e−nλ, and the statistic is φ(x) = x.
The form of the PPD p(x|ν, n) is also a familiar distribution,
in the negative binomial family (Gelman et al. 2013, p.44).
As mentioned above, we will show how to compute the
hyperparameters ν and n of the PPD from its first two mo-
ments µ1 and µ2. As the form of the PPD is known to
be negative binomial, one can easily calculate or look up
what these moments are in terms of the hyperparameters:
µ1 = ν/n and µ2 = ν(ν + n + 1)/n2. Fortunately, given
these equations, we can simply solve for the hyperparame-
ters in terms of the moments, which we can elicit robustly:
n = µ1/(µ2 + µ
2
1 + µ1) and ν = nµ1. This already veri-
fies the injectivity condition of Corollary 3, so we know that
optimal aggregation is possible.
For concreteness, let us return to the bird watching exam-
ple to show how eBird might reward users in such a way
as to truthfully obtain predictions and then compute their
optimal aggregation. The protocol would be for eBird to an-
nounce that a representative will be sent tomorrow to count
the number x of birds seen in a minute, and to ask each user
i for a prediction ri,1 about E[x] and ri,2 about E[x2], with
the understanding that after the count x is revealed, agent i
will receive a reward of
S(ri,1, ri,2, x) = 2ri,1x− r2i,1 + 2ri,2x2 − r2i,2 . (8)
(We use the Brier score (3) only for concreteness; any
strictly proper scoring rule can be used.) With the reports
in hand, eBird can compute ni = ri,1/(ri,2 + r2i,1 + ri,1)
and νi = niri,1. Assuming the common prior parameters
(ν0, n0) are known, eBird simply aggregates these reports
to n = n0 +
∑m
i=1(ni − n0) and ν = ν0 +
∑m
i=1(νi − ν0),
arriving at the global PPD p(x|X) = p(x|ν, n).
Normal As we saw in Section 2, the Normal distribution
with known variance but unknown mean allows for optimal
aggregation. This follows from Corollary 3 as well, since
N(µ, σ2) is a different distribution for each setting of µ, σ.
Uniform Perhaps the most basic of distributions is the uni-
form distribution on [0, θ], where p(x|θ) = 1/θ in that in-
terval. As a simple application, consider the problem of de-
termining the number of raffle tickets sold at a fair by ask-
ing random people what their ticket number is. It is well-
known that the Pareto distribution is a conjugate prior for
this case, and the hyperparameter update is ν = max(ν0, x)
and n = n0 + 1. Observe that the hyperparameter update
is not linear, so we cannot simply apply Corollary 3. How-
ever, it is easy to see that the conclusion still holds here,
as the principal can easily aggregate {(νi, ni)}mi by taking
ν = max{νi}mi=0 and n = n0 +
∑
i(ni − n0) as usual.
By a simple calculation, one can show that the PPD in this
case is a mixture of a uniform distribution and a Pareto dis-
tribution, from which one can compute the moments µ1 =
nν/2(n − 1) and µ2 = nν2/3(n − 2). Canceling ν, these
equations give a quadratic equation with a unique root n sat-
isfying n > 2 (a requirement of the prior), from which ν can
also be calculated. Thus, the principal can achieve optimal
aggregation in this case as well.
4 The Non-Unique Case
Imagine a setting where the principal wants to aggregate in-
formation from agents to estimate the bias of a coin. The
principal asks agents Bob and Carol, who each see some un-
known number of coin flips, after which Bob reports that the
coin is unbiased, whereas Carol reports that it is biased 10-
to-1 toward Heads. With only this information, which cor-
responds to the full PPDs of both agents, it is easily seen to
be impossible to optimally aggregate these reports, as it is
unclear how many flips each agent saw. Even if the princi-
pal knows that Carol saw 20 flips, she cannot tell whether
Bob saw none and just reported the prior, or whether he saw
1000 and is practically certain of the bias of the coin. (For-
mally, we can explain this by noting that the conjugate prior
is the Beta distribution, which does not satisfy Theorem 2.)
How can the principal circumvent this impossibility to still
achieve optimal aggregation in this setting?
In this section we will consider a more general ver-
sion of the coin flip example, using the categorical fam-
ily of distributions, i.e., the whole of ∆X for X = [K] =
{1, 2, . . . ,K}. Here the common conjugate prior is the
Dirichlet distribution p(θ|α), whose hyperparameters α ∈
RK encode pseudo-counts, so that αi corresponds to the
number of occurrences of outcome i an agent has seen. More
formally, we take Θ = ∆X = ∆K , and for α ∈ RK we let
p(i|θ) = θi , p(θ|α) = Γ(n)∏K
i=1 Γ(αi)
K∏
i=1
θαi−1i , (9)
where n =
∑K
i=1 αi corresponds to the total number of
(pseudo-) samples observed, and Γ is the Gamma distribu-
tion.3 It is well-known that the mean of the Dirichlet distri-
bution is E[θ|α] = α/n, which is just a normalized version
of the pseudo-counts. Taken as an element of ∆X , this is also
the PPD: if an agent sees x= 1 and x= 2 each eight times
and x = 3 four times, then α = (8, 8, 4) and his PPD will
be (2/5, 2/5, 1/5). We can see now why Theorem 2 tells
us that optimal aggregation is impossible: scaling α by any
positive amount yields the same PPD, just as with the coin
flip example above, but when aggregating α’s from multiple
agents, different relative scales yield different global PPDs.
Fortunately, despite this impossibility, we now show that
if the principal can simply obtain two of her own samples,
she can use them both to glean second-order information
from the agents, and then optimally aggregate. The idea be-
hind the mechanism is extremely simple: ask the agent for
the distribution p of the first sample, and the probability b
that the two samples are the same. As discussed above, the
reported p gives α/n, and it turns out that the scaling factor
n, which corresponds to the confidence of the agent, can be
3Note that we have departed from our (ν, n) notation to match
the convention for the Dirichlet distribution; otherwise we could
take ν to be the first K − 1 coordinates of α, and keep n the same.
expressed as a simple formula of p and b. Note that the result
does not depend on the particular choice of scoring rule; we
use a combination of the log score and Brier score only as
an illustration.
Theorem 4. Let X = [K], and let {p(i|θ)} and {p(θ|α)}
be the categorical and Dirichlet families from eq. (9). Then
given two independent samples x1, x2 ∈ X , the mechanism
S : ∆X × [0, 1]×X × X → R defined by
S(p, b, x1, x2) = log p(x1) + 2b · 1{x1 =x2} − b2 (10)
achieves optimal aggregation.
Proof. Focusing first on a single agent, by propriety of the
log scoring rule, the agent will report p = p( · |α) = α/n,
where once again n =
∑K
i=1 αi. Similarly, by propriety of
the Brier score, the agent will report his belief about the
probability that x1 = x2. We can calculate this easily:
b = Pr[x1 = x2]
= E
θ∼p(θ|α)
[∑K
i=1 p(x1 = i, x2 = i |θ)
]
= E
θ∼p(θ|α)
[∑K
i=1 p(x1 = i |θ)p(x2 = i |θ)
]
= E
θ∼p(θ|α)
[∑K
i=1 θiθi
]
=
∑K
i=1 Var[θi|α] + E[θi|α]2 .
It is known that Var[θi|α] = αi(n−αi)n2(n+1) , so the first term be-
comes∑
i
Var[θi|α] = (
∑
i αi)n−
∑
i α
2
i
n2(n+ 1)
=
1− ‖p‖2
n+ 1
,
as we also have
∑
i E[θi|α]2 = ‖p‖2 = ‖α‖2/n2. Putting
this together, we have b = 1−‖p‖
2
n+1 − ‖p‖2, so n = 1−bb−‖p‖2
and finally α = np. Finally, turning to the aggregation of
multiple predictions, the result follows by the same argu-
ment as in Theorem 2: we simply use eqs. (5), (6), and (7)
to discount the prior from each agent’s report and sum.
Returning to the coin flip example, we can now see how
the principal can resolve the dilemma from before. Instead of
simply asking the probability that a single flip is Heads, the
principal should obtain two independent flips and then ask
the agents for the probability that the first is Heads, and the
probability that the two flips are the same. By Theorem 4, the
answers to these two intuitive questions give the principal
enough information to optimally aggregate.
5 Future Work
A well known and broad class of distributions with conju-
gate priors are the exponential families (see the full version-
for a primer). Many of the examples discussed in this pa-
per are specific exponential families, and thus it is a natural
question to ask whether our results can be shown to hold
for all such distributions. In particular, our study opens two
interesting questions, whose answers would imply some in-
teresting structure of exponential families.
The first follows naturally from Theorem 2 and the exam-
ples in Section 3, several of which are exponential families,
and all of which admit optimal aggregation. We conjecture
that for exponential families, the success of a single-sample
mechanism depends only on the dimension of the statistic
φ. The second open question is similar: does the two-sample
technique from Section 4 succeed for all exponential fami-
lies? Again, we conjecture positively.
Conjecture 1. Optimal aggregation with a single sample is
possible for an exponential family with minimal statistic φ if
and only if |X | > dimφ+ 1.
Conjecture 2. Given an exponential family with statistic φ,
the mechanism which elicits the expected values of φ(x1)
and φ(x1)φ(x2)> can optimally aggregate.
The intuition behind these conjectures, which we outline
in the full version, lies in concentration properties in the pos-
terior distribution p(x|ν, n) as n increases to infinity. Be-
cause of the simple form of exponential families, and the ex-
ponential decay inherent in their definition, we believe that
these results can be obtained.
Finally, we would like to mention a possible extension.
While our model assumes that the principal wishes to ag-
gregate all information, in reality, agents may have different
costs to gather their samples, and the principal may therefore
desire to aggregate a more efficient amount of information
given this cost. Fang, Stinchcombe, and Whinston (2007)
show that this can be done in a restricted setting with Normal
distributions. Can this still be done in our more general set-
ting? What if agents can acquire different amounts of infor-
mation at different costs, for example, if a convex function
specifies their cost to acquire any number of samples? We
hope to address these and related questions in future work.
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